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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF DIPLOMATIC 
PROTECTION IN RESOLVING ZIMBABWE'S 
LAND CRISIS 
joNATHAN SHIRLEY* 
Abstract: Zimbabwe's most recent land reform program has targeted 
thousands of commercial farms for compulsory acquisition. This Note 
analyzes what protections and remedies reside in international human 
rights law and the law of diplomatic protection for commercial farmers 
deprived of their property as a result of this program. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three years, Zimbabwe has implemented an aggres-
sive program to redistribute its farming lands, which, as a legacy of 
colonial rule, had been predominantly owned by white commercial 
farmers. 1 Although real land reform has been on Zimbabwe's agenda 
since its independence in 1980, this most recent "fast track" plan is 
widely viewed as a tactic by President Robert Mngabe to bolster his 
political support and enrich his cronies. 2 In the process, commercial 
farmers have been driven from their land by government sanctioned 
violence and deprived of their livelihood without fair compensation.3 
This Note analyzes Zimbabwe's land reform program in the context of 
international law. Specifically, it explores what principles, if any, exist 
in international law to protect the property rights of Zimbabwe's 
commercial farmers. This Note concludes that the only relevant prin-
ciples, human rights and diplomatic protection, are inadequate or 
unavailable as recourses in international law in this situation. 
*Jonathan Shirley is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 John McClung Nading, Note, Pmperty Under Siege: The Legality of Land Reform in Zim-
babwe, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 737, 742, 750 (2002). 
2 See id. at 739-41. 
3 Sec id. at 755-60. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Roots of Zimbabwe's Land C1isis 
Zimbabwe has a total population of more than twelve million peo-
ple and a land area of approximately thirty-nine hectares.4 Zimbabwe's 
black population represents ninety-seven percent of the total popula-
tion, whereas whites represent less than two percent.5 Despite the over-
whelming black majority, ownership of farm lands in Zimbabwe is un-
evenly distributed.6 At the turn of this century, there were approxi-
mately 4800 large scale commercial farms located on eleven million 
hectares of land.7 Of these commercial farms, 4500 were white-owned.8 
In contrast, one million black families had been confined to farming in 
exclusively black communal areas covering sixteen million hectares.9 
Only a small percentage of this communal land, however, was arable 
enough to farm. to 
The disparity between black and white land ownership in Zim-
babwe is the direct result of its colonial heritage. 11 Under British rule, 
racially discriminatory laws reserved the most fertile farming land to 
the white minority. 12 This inequitable distribution largely fueled Zim-
babwe's civil war in the 1970s.I3 It was also a prominent issue in the 
peace talks that led to the Lancaster House Agreement, the landmark 
accord establishing Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.14 
After independence Zimbabwe struggled to realize true land re-
form.15 Concerned for the plight of white farmers in a majority-ruled 
independent Zimbabwe, the British government mandated a clause in 
the new constitution that protected land ownership from compulsory 
acquisition for a ten year period.16 Upon the expiration of that mora-
4 Thomas Mitchell, The Land Crisis in Zimbabwe: Getting Beyond the Myopic Focus upon 
Black & lVhite, 11 IND. INT'L & CaMP. L. REv. 587,591 (2001). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8Jd. 
9 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 592. 
10 See id. 
11 See Heather Boyle, Note, The Land Problem: What Does the Future Hold for South Africa's 
Land Reform Program?, 11 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 665,686 (2001). 
12 See id. 
13 See International Bar Association, Report of Zimbabwe Mission 2001, § 7.3 (Apr. 23, 
2001), http:/ /www.loc.gov/law/guide/zimbabwe.html [hereinafter Zimbabwe Report]. 
14 See id. 
15 Seeid. § 7.4-.10. 
16 See Boyle, supm note 11, at 687. 
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torium, Zimbabwe's Parliament amended the constitution to allow 
compulsory acquisition ofland by the government subject to payment 
of fair compensation.17 By 1999, Zimbabwe had purchased 3.8 million 
hectares offarming land and resettled 71,000 black families.l 8 
B. Politics and ''Farm Invasions" 
President Robert Mugabe has governed Zimbabwe since its inde-
pendence in 1980.19 Moreover, his ruling party, the Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has largely dominated the 
country's political landscape.20 In 1999, however, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) emerged as a viable opposition party. 21 
Campaigning on a platform of reforms,22 the MDC garnered 
significant support from both black and white voters.23 Indeed, in the 
June 2000 parliamentary elections, the MDC won fifty-seven out of the 
one hundred twenty seats available. 24 
Even before the parliamentary elections, Mugabe recognized that 
the MDC's rising popularity threatened his hegemony. 25 In response, 
he embarked on his own campaign to break the MDC and destroy its 
political base.26 Perceiving white commercial farmers as part of that 
base,27 Mugabe sought to hasten the land reform program, thereby 
eliminating commercial farmers as a voting bloc and winning back 
rural support with the promise of land resettlement. 28 To that end, 
Parliament passed a constitutional amendment and legislative act in 
the spring of 200029 that enabled the Mugabe government to imple-
ment an accelerated agricultural acquisition program known as the 
"fast track" plan.30 Within two years, this plan targeted 3000 commer-
17 See Zimbabwe Report, supra note 13, § 7.6. 
18 Id. § 7.7. 
19 ld. § 2.3. 
20 Id. 
21 See id. § 2.7. 
22 See Philip Gourevitch, Wasteland, THE NEW YoRKER, June 3, 2002, at 59, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. 
23 See id. 
24 Zimbabwe Report, supra note 13, § 2.7. 
25 See id. § 7.16. 
26 See id. 
27 See Gourevitch, supra note 22. 
28 See Zimbabwe Report, supra note 13, § 7.16. 
29 See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 596. These legislative acts occurred under the ZANU-PF 
dominated parliament that had existed prior to the June 2000 elections. !d. 
30 ld. 
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cial farms for acquisition.31 Unlike previous land reform programs, 
however, the plan only compensated farmers for improvements to the 
land, not for the value of the land itself.32 Moreover, compensation 
was set off by any previous subsidies the government may have paid to 
the land owners.33 
At the same time the "fast track" plan was implemented, groups 
alleging to be veterans of the 1970s civil war descended on white-
owned commercial farms and claimed plots of land for themselves.34 
Although the Mugabe government rejected allegations that it incited 
these events, it refused to intervene and impose the rule of law.35 
Rather, it called the farm invasions a "mere peaceful demonstration" 
by Zimbabweans frustrated by the slow pace of land reform.36 The in-
vasions, however, were anything but peaceful.37 A survey conducted by 
the Commercial Farmers' Union reported that the invasions often 
resulted in abductions, assaults, death threats, and rape against the 
farmers and their workers.38 By 2002, the invasions had also caused 
the deaths of ten commercial farmers.39 
As of today, Mugabe 's "fast track" plan is nearly complete. 40 Of the 
4500 white commercial farms in Zimbabwe at the turn of the century, 
only 400 remain.41 Many farmers are appealing the acquisitions in Zim-
babwe's courts. 42 Relief is unlikely, however, since Zimbabwe's judiciary 
is also under attack from the Mugabe government and its war veter-
ans. 43 Accused of being sympathetic to white farmers, lower court 
31 !d. at 597. 
32 !d. at 596-97. 
33 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 596 n.70. 
34 See Rahman Ford, Law History, and the Colonial Discourse: Davies v. Commissioner and 
Zimbabwe as a Colonialist Case Study, 45 How. LJ. 213, 241 (2001). 
35 See Zimbabwe Report, supra note 13, § 7.18. 
36 !d. § 7.19. Eyewitness accounts, however, suggest that Mugabe's government was in-
deed involved in orchestrating these invasions. See id. § 7.16. Witness reported seeing gov-
ernment vehicles transport the war veterans to farms they intended to occupy. See id. In 
addition, the government was reportedly paying daily stipends to the occupiers. See id. 
37 Ford, supra note 34, at 242. 
38 !d. 
39 See 'White Fanner Killed in Zimbabwe, BBC NEws, Mar. 18, 2002, at http:/ /news.bbc.co. 
uk/1/hi/world/africa/1878846.stm. 
40 See Black Zimbabweans Suffer in Land Reform, BBC NEws, Nov. 7, 2002, at http:/ I 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2414713.stm [hereinafter BBC NEws, Zimbabweans 
Suffe1]. 
41 !d. 
42 See The Situation Today, BBC NEws, at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/english/static/ 
in_depth/ africa/2000/zimbabwe_crisis/ slideshow I situation.stm [hereinafter BBC NEws, 
Situation Today]. 
43 See Zimbabwe Report, supra note 13, §§ 9.1-.2, 9.10-.12. 
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judges have been threatened with violence while the Supreme Court 
Chief Justice has been forced to resign.44 As for the land acquired un-
der the "fast track" plan intended for needy families, much of it has 
ended up in the hands ofMugabe's cronies.45 Furthermore, the disrup-
tion to the farming industry caused by land reform has decimated crop 
production and brought the country to the brink offamine.46 
II. ANALYSIS 
Zimbabwe's "fast track" plan has dispossessed commercial farm-
ers of their property while denying them fair compensation and effec-
tive legal recourse.47 Since Zimbabwe municipal law appears to be fail-
ing the commercial farmers, the only hope for justice resides in inter-
nationallaw.48 But what principles of international law, if any, protect 
individuals' property rights? This question implicates two principles: 
human rights and diplomatic protection. 
A. P1ivate Property Ownership as an Intemational Human Right 
The development of human rights as a modern principle of inter-
national law began over fifty years ago with the United Nations' Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration).49 Since then, 
the United Nations and other organizations of states have assembled 
conventions to further articulate global and regional conceptions of 
human rights.5o Although private property ownership is expressed as a 
human right in two of the documents relevant to this analysis, the no-
tion is far too vaguely stated to provide any substantive protection for 
Zimbabwe's commercial farmers.51 
44 See id. 
45 See BBC NEWS, Zimbabweans SuffeJ; supra note 40. 
46 See id. 
47 See Zimbabwe Report, supra note 13, §§ 7, 9. 
48 See generally id. § 9. 
49 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
50 See Emily Bourdeaux Smith, Note, South .1ftica's Land Reform Policy and International 
Human Rights Law, 19 Wis. INT'L LJ. 267, 274-75 (2001). 
51 See id. at 274. 
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1. The United Nations and Private Property Ownership Rights 
During the mid-twentieth century, the United Nations endeavored 
to create a core body of international human rights. 52 The documents 
crafted to express these rights, however, were very much products of 
Cold War ideological tensions. 53 These tensions are manifestly apparent 
in the U.N.'s articulation of private property ownership rights.54 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights drafted the 
Universal Declaration as an initial step towards promulgating a bill of 
international human rights.55 Although adopted as a nonbinding 
resolution in 1948, the Universal Declaration has over time attained 
the status of customary international law. 56 
The Universal Declaration addresses the right to private property 
ownership in Article 17, which states that "[e]veryone has the right to 
own property alone as well as in association with others" and that 
"[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."57 The lan-
guage in Article 17 appears on its face to fashion an inalienable right 
to private property ownership.58 The Universal Declaration, however, 
does not define what constitutes "arbitrary deprivation. "59 Conse-
quently, the extent of protection afforded by the Universal Declara-
tion in relation to private property ownership is vague at best.60 
In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights6l and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.62 These 
Covenants were drafted in order to further define the scope and ex-
tent of many of the rights established in the Universal Declaration.63 
52 See J.D. Van Der Vyver, Ownership in Constitutional and International Law, 1985 AcTA 
jURIDICA 119, 129 (1985). 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Smith, supra note 50, at 273. 
56 THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NoRMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 
82 (1989). 
57 Universal Declaration, supra note 49, art. 17. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See Smith, supra note 50, at 274. 
61 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter 
CESCR]. 
62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter CCPR]. 
63 Compare Universal Declaration, supra note 49, with CESCR, supra note 61, and CCPR, 
supra note 62. 
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Conspicuously absent from either of the Covenants, however, is any 
elaboration on the right to private property ownership. 54 This absence 
is attributed to the Cold War ideological disparity between eastern 
Soviet bloc states and western democracies with regard to private 
property ownership.65 Consequently, in an effort to forge consensus 
on other human rights issues and encourage wide adoption of the 
Covenants during the Cold War, the United Nations chose to avoid 
the divisive issue of property rights. 66 
Because a clear articulation by the United Nations of a human 
right to private property ownership was impeded by Cold War ideo-
logical wrangling,67 few conclusions can be drawn from applying the 
United Nations' articulation of property rights to the plight of Zim-
babwe's commercial farmers.68 Since the "fast track" plan was imple-
mented through a constitutional amendment and legislative act, it 
operates under a guise of due process of law.69 Without further elabo-
ration on the meaning of "arbitrary deprivation," such symbolic due 
process may be all that is necessary to satisfy the Universal Declara-
tion's requirement that property not be arbitrarily deprived.7° 
2. The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
In conjunction with the United Nations' articulation of universal 
human rights, various organizations of states have adopted conven-
tions reflecting geographic-specific human rights concerns.71 In M-
rica, the Organization of Mrican Unity (OAU) adopted the Banjul 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Charter),72 which Zimbabwe 
ratified in 1986.73 
The Charter articulates human rights owing to the individuals, 
citizens, and "peoples" of Mrica.74 Although the Charter does not 
64 Sec CCPR, supra note 62; CESCR, supm note 61. 
65 Van Der Vyver, supra note 52, at 129. 
66 Sec id. 
67 Sec id. 
68 See id. 
69 See Nading, supra note 1, at 755. 
70 Sec Universal Declaration, supra note 49, art. 17. 
71 Smith, supra note 50, at 274-75. The Americas and Europe haYe also ratified re-
gional human rights documents. Id. 
72 Organization of Mrican Unity: Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 
1982, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. 
73 University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, List of Countries Who Have Signed, 
Ratified/ Adhered to the Mrican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, at http:/ I 
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ratz1afchr.htm (Jan. 1, 2000). 
74 See Banjul Charter, sttpm note 72, arts. 10-17. 
168 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:161 
define the meaning of "peoples' rights," the term suggests a form of 
collective rights that may be exercised or claimed by a state on behalf 
of its inhabitants. 75 
The Charter addresses property rights in Article 14,76 which be-
gins by plainly stating that " [ t] he right to property shall be guaran-
teed. "77 The phrase itself is curious since, unlike the surrounding arti-
cles, it does not specify whether the right flows to individuals, citizens, 
or peoples. 78 This inconsistency, however, is overshadowed by the Ar-
ticle's final clause, which allows property rights to be encroached "in 
the interest of public need ... and in accordance with the provisions 
of appropriate laws."79 Critics of the Charter have labeled this lan-
guage a "claw-back" clause because it permits states, in their nearly 
unrestrained discretion, to restrict the rights guaranteed by the Char-
ter.80 Hence, by subordinating Charter rights to states' laws, the clause 
emasculates the Charter's effectiveness.81 
Therefore, the language in Article 14 provides little, if any, real 
protection to Zimbabwe's commercial farmers.82 As noted earlier, the 
"fast track" plan was implemented through a constitutional amend-
ment and legislative act.83 Thus, because the taking of commercial 
farmers' land is proscribed by Zimbabwe's municipal law, it conforms 
with the Charter according to a plain reading of Article 14.84 
Another aspect of the Charter is equally concerning for Zim-
babwe's commercial farmers. 85 Article 21 states, in part, that "[i]n case 
of spoliation86 the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful 
recovery of its property. "87 Considering the history of the Mrican con-
tinent, the Charter's use of the term "spoliation" is arguably a reference 
to the exploitation of Mrican lands and resources by colonial imperial-
75 Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, A C1itique of the Aj1ican Charter on Human and People's Rights, 
31 How. LJ. 643, 656 (1988). 
76 Banjul Charter, supra note 72, art. 14. 
77 ld. 
78 See id. 
79 ld. 
80 Bondzie-Sirnpson, supra note 75, at 660. 
81 ld. at 661. 
82 See id. 
83 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 596. 
84 See Bondzie-Sirnpson, supra note 75, at 661. 
85 Banjul Charter, supra note 72, art. 21. 
86 Spoliation is "[t)he seizure of personal or real property by violent means; the act of 
pillaging." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (7th abr. ed. 2000). 
87 Banjul Charter, supra note 72, art. 21. 
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ists.88 With this historical context in mind, Article 21 may be inter-
preted as bestowing upon Mrican peoples dispossessed of their prop-
erty under colonial rule a right to recovery.89 Consequently, rather than 
condemning the "fast track" plan, the Charter appears to legitimize it. 90 
The program is justified under Article 21 because it takes land that had 
been apportioned under colonial rule (to the benefit of commercial 
farmers) and returns it to its rightful owners-native Zimbabweans.91 
Ultimately, like the Universal Declaration, the Charter provides 
no real protection for the property rights of Zimbabwe's commercial 
farmers.92 Although it guarantees the right to own property, the Char-
ter subordinates that right to a state's municipallaws.93 Moreover, the 
Charter seems as concerned with eradicating the vestiges of colonial 
rule as it does with promoting human rights.94 As such, it appears to 
target Zimbabwe's commercial farmers more than protect them.95 
B. Diplomatic Protection 
An alternative recourse in international law may be found in the 
principle of diplomatic protection.96 Under this principle, a state may 
seek reparations on behalf of its nationals injured by acts contrary to 
international law committed by another state.97 For an individual to 
seek diplomatic protection, three elements must exist: (1) the indi-
vidual must be harmed as a result of a state's violation of international 
law; (2) the individual must exhaust all local remedies in that state's 
domestic courts; and (3) the individual must be a national of another 
state at the time harm occurred.98 Although the situation in Zim-
babwe will likely satisfY the first two elements for diplomatic protec-
tion,99 establishing Zimbabwe's commercial farmers as nationals of 
another state is a significant obstacle. 
88 See Nading, supra note 1, at 742-47. 
89 Banjul Charter, supra note 72, art. 21. 
90 See Bondzie-Simpson, supra note 75, at 661. 
91 Banjul Charter, supra note 72, art. 21. 
92 See Bondzie-Simpson, supra note 75, at 661. 
93 See id. at 660. 
94 See Banjul Charter, supra note 72, art. 21. 
95 See id. 
96 See CUTHBERT jOSEPH, NATIONALITY AND DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION: THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF NATIONS 1 (1969). 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 1-8. 
99 Assuming a foreign national's land is acquired under the "fast track" plan, Zim-
babwe will arguably violate the customary international law of expropriation because it 
does not pay just compensation for the land. See Hans W. Baade, Pennauent Sovereignty over 
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1. Determining Nationality 
At one time, Mrican citizens of former British colonies were rec-
ognized as British subjects, and the British government afforded them 
diplomatic protection.100 However, this practice vanished soon after 
the Second World War. 101 Therefore, Zimbabwe's commercial farmers 
may no longer rely on their colonial heritage to establish themselves 
as British nationals.1o2 
Notwithstanding the demise of this practice, Zimbabwean com-
mercial farmers possessing dual British citizenship may potentially 
access diplomatic protection.l03 To do so, however, these dual citizens 
must demonstrate that their dominant and effective nationality is that 
of United Kingdom, not Zimbabwe.104 Determining the dominant and 
effective nationality of a dual citizen was most recently considered by 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal).l05 
In Case A/18, the Tribunal was presented with the question of 
whether individuals possessing dual Iranian/U.S. citizenship were en-
titled to bring claims against the Iranian government for its expro-
priation of property.106 Under the 1930 Hague Convention on Na-
tionality, "a [s] tate may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its 
nationals against a [s] tate whose nationality such person also pos-
sesses. "107 Thus, dual citizens were traditionally precluded from seek-
ing diplomatic protection against a state of which they were a citi-
zen.108 The Tribunal, however, analyzed the development of interna-
tional law with respect to nationality after the Second World War.I09 
Noting two key decisions, the Tribunal held that claimants must be 
NatumllVealth and Resources, in ESSAYS ON EXPROPRIATIONS 22 (Richard S. Miller & Roland 
J. Stanger eds., 1967). Moreover, Zimbabwe's commercial farmers are currently appealing 
the government's acquisitions and will, presumably, soon exhaust all local remedies in 
Zimbabwe's domestic courts. See BBC NEws, Situation Today, supra note 42. 
100 JosEPH, supra note 96, at 239. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 It is estimated that 20,000 Zimbabwean citizens have British passports. See Michael 
Evans, MoD Watches for il.ny Risk to Britons, TIMES (London), June 26, 2000, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. Although unknown, it is conceivable that some of these 
individuals are commercial farmers. Id. 
104 See Iran-United States, Case No. A/18, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 251 (Iran-U.S. Claims 
Trib. 1984). 
1o5 Jd. 
106 See id. at 253. 
107 JosEPH, supm note 96, at 9. 
108 See id. 
109 See 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 263. 
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evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine their "dominant and 
effective nationality. "IIO Under this test, the Tribunal would evaluate 
several factors to determine the nationality of claimants, including 
their habitual residence, the center of their interests, their family ties, 
their participation in public life, and attachment shown by them for a 
given country and inculcated in their children. III 
Unfortunately, under this test, most commercial farmers with 
dual citizenship will probably be found to have their dominant and 
effective nationality tied to Zimbabwe.112 Since farming is a land in-
tensive occupation, most commercial farmers have likely established 
their center of interests and family ties in Zimbabwe.'13 Although co-
lonial heritage at one time may have been significant, it is no longer a 
factor considered when determining one's nationality.ll4 Tlms, dip-
lomatic protection will largely be unavailable as a recourse in interna-
tional law for Zimbabwe's commercial farmers.II5 
CoNCLUSION 
The "fast track" land reform plan has stripped thousands of com-
mercial farmers of their land and livelihoods. The failure of Zim-
babwe's municipal law to protect private property rights leaves interna-
tional law as the final arbiter of justice. Unfortunately, the only two ap-
plicable principles of international law offer little in the way of 
protection or remedy. Although some international human rights 
documents recognize private property ownership, factors such as Cold 
War ideological tensions and "claw-back" clauses have left the right 
vaguely articulated and substantively meaningless. Conversely, even 
those commercial farmers lucky enough to have dual British/ Zimbab-
wean citizenship will likely not be able to seek diplomatic protection. 
Commercial farming is an occupation so intrinsically tied to Zim-
babwe's land that establishing a dominant and effective nationality of 
another state is nearly impossible. 
11o Id. at 263-65. 
111 Id. at 263. 
112 See Forced to Flee Zimbabwe, BBC NEWS, July 4, 2000, at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
hi/world/africa/818766.stm. 
113 See id. 
114 JosEPH, supra note 96, at 239. 
115 See id. 
